On
November 3, 2009, the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the
University of Delaware hosted a Round Table entitled the “Pros and Cons of
Separating the Chairman and CEO Positions.”
Designed to review the state of play in leadership duality and to see
what consensus, if any, could be achieved around this issue, the Round Table
examined the issue from both a US and global perspective, and considered the
theoretical and practical implications of one the bigger shifts in contemporary
US corporate governance.
The panel featured some of the leading experts and with broad experience in
governance issues. Present were:
· The
Honorable William Chandler, Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery
· James
D. Robinson, III, General partner, RRE Ventures; Retired Charman, Bristol Myers
Squibb; Director, Coca-Cola, and Novell; Former Chair and CEO, American Express
·
Robert
Monks, advisor Trucost, founder of Lens Governance Advisors, founder of
Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. et. al.
· Jon
Hanson, Founder & Chairman, The Hampshire Companies; Non-Executive
Chairman, HealthSouth Corporation; Lead Director, Prudential Insurance
· Ira
Millstein, Senior Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges
·
Harry
Kraemer, Executive Partner, Madison Dearborn Partners, Former Chair and CEO,
Baxter International Inc.;
· Bess
Joffe, Associate Director, Hermes Investment Management Limited
· Stuart
Grant, Grant & Eisenhofer, Wilmington, DE
The
panel was chaired and moderated by Weinberg Center Director and Professor
Charles Elson, and was co-organized with Jim Christie of Director and Boards
Magazine. Also present were Travis
Laster, Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery and Peggy Foran, of
Prudential Insurance.
The
discussion gravitated towards the idea that the evolution of governance to
date, which the panel members experienced firsthand, pointed towards the
inevitable separation of the chairman and CEO positions. Broad discussion was held about the
differences between a non-executive chairman and a lead director, and the various
models that lead to an enhancement of shareholder value.
Significantly,
despite the differences in backgrounds and experiences of the panel, broad
consensus was achieved around the following:
· Universal
consensus was reached on the idea that should shareholders desire the roles be
split, there should be no impediment to that structure. However, while many on the panel were in
agreement that a “default position” could be a Chair and CEO split (and ability
for shareholder override) all agreed that a legislative or judicial mandate is
a mistake and a bad idea.
· The
evolutionary trend toward a split in the US appears inevitable, certainly among
larger corporations.
· The
discussion was then directed towards guidance in selecting an effective
independent chairman and how they should function. The panel agreed that additional work on the
roles and responsibilities of an independent Chair would be a meaningful next
step. It is clear what the role of a
combined Chairman/CEO is, it is less clear where the duties of an independent
chair begin and end.
Perhaps
it is a sign of the times when a previously hot button issue has reached a
level of acceptance and a resulting focus on implementation rather than on
threshold issues of utility. A major
take-away for policy makers is that a mandate by fiat is problematic, and would
deprive companies and their owners with the necessary flexibility to create and
run their business in the most effective manner. Sometime it’s best to allow private ordering
under state regimes (proxy access?) before the federal government writes rules
that may be difficult to administer and may actually hurt rather than
help.