This Governance Series is the first summary paper drawn from the Conference “Corporate Governance and Managing Firm Risk” co-sponsored by the Weinberg Center and the Leonard N. Stern School of Business at New York University. Weinberg Center Governance Series papers are short summaries of events or longer papers, designed for use by board members or policy makers and introductions to the original longer works of the field in general.
The Weinberg Center has no ideological or political bias, and seeks to conduct its mission in furtherance of investor protection and effective, transparent corporate governance. History suggests that independent boards of directors, with meaningful equity stakes in the corporations they oversee, function as effective corporate stewards when they are subject to open shareholder elections. Under such a system, investor protection and shareholder value are promoted and enhanced. We search for insight, understanding and solutions to the issues that matter in corporate governance and hope to promote sound and effective governance practices that engender economic growth and innovation.
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